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Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Market Analysis Model
A new launch vehicle will tail in the commercial marketplace unless an adequate
number of flights can be sold at a price sufficient to pay for operations plus recoup the
initial development cost. Of course, the price must also include a reasonable return to the
investors. The Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Market Analysis Model estimates an
annual flight rate for a given price per flight. Used in conjunction with the RLV Economic
Analysis Model, a launch vehicle concept can be examined to determine business viability
with regards to investor profits. For the government, the models are used to examine the
effects of incentives on RLV business viability and the macroeconomic benefits of
reducing the cost of access to space.
The model is constructed to examine the effects of a VentureStar Lclass vehicle
entering the competitive market around 2005. Performance for this vehicle is assumed to
be 40,000 pounds to a 160x160 nautical mile orbit with a 15 foot diameter by 45 foot long
cargo bay. Such a vehicle could conceivably launch all payloads envisioned for that time
frame with the exception of Titan IV class payloads (due to volume constraints). By
assuming such a large vehicle, the model eliminates the need to identify and manifest
payloads based on mission specific requirements. Instead the model (simplistically
perhaps) assumes that the vehicle can capture all missions within the date base, and the
only discriminator is price per flight.
A basic model assumption is that the vehicle is capable of performing a wide
variety of missions, from Space Station support to communications satellite launches.
However, the model does not validate the realism of the estimated flight rate against the
operations or vehicle concept. It is up to the economic model to purchase the required
number of vehicles and facilities.
Market Structure
Research into future payload requirements determined that the overall market for
launch services is non-homogenous. That is, the market drivers vary by customer needs,
and these needs drive the quantity and quality of service provided. Therefore, to facilitate
development of the model, the payload market is divided into three segments. The payload
requirements and market drivers for each segment are examined to determine the best
modeling approach. The final products are independent models for the following three
market segments: Inelastic, Non-Elastic, and Elastic.
The inelastic market is International Space Station (ISS) servicing. The market is
termed inelastic because the RLV gets all of these missions, regardless of price per flight.
The assumption is that a VentureStar class vehicle can perform all logistics flights
necessary for the ISS, including crew rotations.
Launch services for communications satellites and United States Government
(USG) payloads comprise the non-elastic market. The term "non-elastic" is used to
describe this market because the behavior is not driven by price per flight. Rather, it is
VentureStar is tile single stage to orbit, fully reusable launch vehicle concept being developed by
Lockheed blartin as part of the X-33 Cooperative Agreement.
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drivenby thedemandfor communicationservicesandUSG payloadbudgets. As anew
competitorin this market, the best RLV can do is take flights away fi-om competing launch
systems that will exist in the 2005 and beyond timeframe. The model performs a market
capture analysis to determine the flight rate.
The elastic market consists of new business opportunities enabled by a drastic
reduction in the price per flight. Characteristics of this market are speculative demand and
high sensitivity to price changes. There is no existing or foreseen competition in this
market, so the RLV captures all flights.
The Inelastic Market
The ISS servicing market is inelastic because changes in the price per flight
have no effect on the flight rate. However, to access this market, it is assumed that the
RLV cost to NASA is less on an annual basis than the cost of the Space Shuttle. NASA
must also make a commitment to fly on the RLV rather than the shuttle (not fly both
simultaneously). The model assumes both a cost below the shuttle and a NASA
commitment, giving the vehicle all ISS servicing flights, without regard for the price per
flight. 2 While it may seem unrealistic to "give" these flights to the vehicle, in actuality the
Agency could not commit to an RLV for ISS servicing without assurances of cost savings
from eliminating shuttle operations, and it is unlikely that a company would commit to
developing a vehicle the size of VentureStar without a guaranteed market.
The number of flights required to perform ISS sen'icing is open to debate.
Planners must balance adequate ISS resupply with the desire to minimize the number of
dockings in order to maximize amount of undisturbed time for microgravity experiment
operation. Estimates from industry and within NASA have ranged from I0 to 16 per year.
For the purposes of this model, 13 flights per ?,ear is assumed to be a realistic estimate.
A ramp-up assumption is built into the [nelastic market model. The model assumes
it will take three years to reach the 13 flight per ?'ear stead?' state ISS servicing rate. In
the first ?'ear, 3 ISS missions are flow. The second year has 7 flights Thirteen flights per
year are attained in the third year of ISS support.
The Non-Elastic Market
The market for launching commercial communication and USG payloads is driven
by the demand for communications services and government payload budgets. Launch
competitors vie for market share based on capability, availability, and price. To simplify
-"Government procurement rules may inhibit an RLV company from charging a price in excess of the
commercial market price. However, there are several reasons why ISS se_'icing missions may be more
costly: (1) additional wear and tear on the vehicle due to longer stays on orbit; (2) lost revenue, also due to
time spent in-space; (3) higher operations cost for longer missions; (4) greater nfission complexity' due to
rende_'ous and docking; and (5) additional costs associated with supporting a human rated module for
ISS crew rotations. Also, the USG may believe that it is in the national interest to pay a premium for ISS
sen'icing flights as a means of ensuring operator profitability while driving down the price per flight for
other market segments.
this market for modeling purposes, vehicle capabilities and prices are averaged and
assumptions are made about overall market behavior.
To estimate the annual number of launches for this market, data is taken from a
variety of sources. Commercial geosynchronous (GEO) communication satellite launch
demand is from the May 1998 "Commercial Spacecraft Mission Model Update"
performed by the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC).
The demand for low earth orbit (LEO) commercial satellite launches is taken from the
"1998 LEO Commercial Market Projections" published by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
Department of Defense (DoD) missions projections are from the August 1997 "Future
Spaceliff Requirements Study (FSRS)" prepared by The Aerospace Corporation for
NASA and the Air Force. The estimate for NASA ELV launches is from information
provided by the Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters. These sources also provided
the data and methodology used to categorize the vehicles and the payloads. To bound the
uncertainty surrounding the estimates, ranges are used. The range for the estimated
number of GEO launches is assumed to be +/- 15%. For LEO commercial, the average
value is the baseline scenario, the optimistic estimates are the robust projections, and the
conservative rate is the average less the difference between the optimistic and average
values. The range for DoD launches is the conservative and optimistic rates given by the
FSRS, with the median between the two being used for the average market model. The
range on the number of NASA launches is +/- 30%. The projected launch demand for the
non-elastic market segment is shown below in Exhibit I.
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Exhibit 1. Annual Number of Non-Elastic Launches.
The competitive marketplace facing the RLV is assumed to consist of today's
expendable launch vehicle (ELV) fleets plus future reusable and expendable vehicles. The
source for cost and performance data for current and future competitors is the
International Space Industries Report 3 (ISIR) supplemented by the International Reference
Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2 na Edition published by the AIAA.
Thirteen vehicle classes encompassing both commercial and US Government
(USG) payloads are used to facilitate the modeling of commercial market behavior. The
market is divided into commercial and USG because satellites developed for the USG can
only launch on vehicles produced within the USA. The vehicles are classed into market
segments based on performance and reflect the classifications used in the COMSTAC,
FAA, FSRS, and NASA Headquarters reports. For each market segment, either the lower
of the average price per flight of all vehicles in a specific class or a predicted price per
flight is used as the equilibrium for the market capture calculation. The predicted price
per flight is based on a price per kilogram model and uses kilograms to orbit and year of
first launch as the independent variables_ Additional information on the price per kilogram
mode[ is available from the author. A summary of the vehicle classes and equilibrium
prices are shown below in Exhibit 2.
Vehicle Class
Commercial GTO
Medium
Medium - Heavy
Hea,vy
Commercial LEO
Small
Medium - Heavy"
US Government GTO
Medium"
Medium - Heavy*
Heavy
US Government LEO
Small*
Small- Medium
Medium*
Medium- Heavy*
Heavy..
Price per
Flight ($M)
$36
$71
$103
$16
$64
$45
$81
$143
$12
$31
$53
$68
$143
Number of
Companies
10
10
1
2
, 2
3
5
2
2
2
Representative Vehicles
Delta 2, CZ-4B, M-5
Ariane 4, Atlas 11,Delta 3, CZ-3A
Ariane 5, CZ-3B, Proton, Zenit 3SL
Athena-I, Pegasus, Start, Kosmos
Ariane. Atlas, Delta, H-2A. Soyuz
Delta 2
Atlas Ill, Atlas HLV-A, Delta 3, Delta 4M
Delta 4H, Atlas HLV
Athena-I, Pegasus, Conestoga
Taurus, Delta 2, Athena -2, K-1
Atlas II, Delta 3, EELV
Atlas III, EELV
EELV Heavy
* Prices Estimated via Trend Analysis
Exhibit 2. Non-Elastic Market Classes.
The mechanism for determining RLV market share is the market capture function.
This function is plotted in Exhibit 3. The market capture function estimates the change in
market share based on the ratio of the RLV price per flight to the equilibrium price per
flight. The function is a fish degree polynomial fitted to exponential growth curves via
regression analysis, Small deviations from the equilibrium price per flight are reflected by
3 "International Space Industries Report, ""June 8, 1998, pp. 22-23.
proportionally smaller changes in market share. However, larger deviations have an
increasingly greater impact, leading eventually to total market capture or total market loss.
The logic behind the function is that the market is non-homogeneous in terms of price and
performance. This non-homogeneity means that an RLV will face competition from other
launch vehicles over a wide range of prices, not just the equilibrium price. Therefore,
small deviations from the equilibrium price will have a limited impact on market share or
loss. However, sufficiently large deviations will begin to either drive out competitors (by
undercutting their cost) or make the RLV uncompetitive. These larger deviations are
reflected by the exponential characteristic of the function4
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Exhibit 3. Non-Elastic Market Behavior Function.
If the RLV enters a market segment at the equilibrium price, the maximum market
share that the RLV can capture is l/N, where N is the total number of competitors in that
market segment including RLV. To determine any increase or decrease in market share,
the RLV price per flight is divided by the equilibrium price and the resulting value is
entered into the market behavior function. The output from the function is added to the
baseline (l/N) market share, then that sum is multiplied by the demand projection to
obtain the annual flight rate. Exhibit 4 illustrates how the data on demand projections
(Exhibit 1) and the competitive market (Exhibit 2) are combined with the market behavior
function (Exhibit 3) to estimate an annual flight rate for a specific vehicle class.
4 The original function was based on the oligopoly kinked demand cu_'e. However, a more detailed
examination of the competitive market revealed a few shortcomings in this model: some market classes
have large numbers of competitors - violating a basic ten,mr of oligopoly: most buyers prefer to spread
their risk among two or more providers - mitigating the effects of price competition: and flight rates for
most (if not all) vehicles are limited by production and launch facilities. The current form of the market
capture function represents an assumption of market behavior based on general economic principles,
rather titan a strict application of economic theory.
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Exhibit 4 Example RLV Non-Elastic Market Share Calculation•
Tv.o additional assumptions are incorporated into the non-elastic market analysis
model. The first is the price for GEO mission upper stages. These prices are assumed to
be a pass<b, rough to the customer, but are added to the base RLV price per flight before
market share calculation. The prices assumed are $10M for a Medium class payload,
$20M for a Medium-Hea,_y, and $30M for a Hea',T.
T?,e second assumption concerns market penetration. There are several reasons
why customers will take time to transition from known and understood ELV's to a new
RLV. Perceived risk ot'a new system, existing business relationships, "teething pains" that
are associated with the implementation of any complex system, and vehicle incompatibility
with existing satellite designs will all work together to inhibit growth. The market
penetration model assumes it will take five years to build the customer base. Initial market
penetration is estimated at 20% (of capturable) and grows at a 50% rate. The second
year market penetration is 30%, then 45% in year three, 68% in year four, and finally
100% in year five. Note that these values are percentages of the total market share that
RLV can capture for a given price per flight 5
Elastic Market
In March, 1993 six aerospace companies met at Langley Research Center (LaRC)
and determined "that a new, state-of-the-art launch system can provide an order of
magnitude reduction in launch costs and that a reduction of that magnitude will cause the
equivalent of a space industrial revolution" and "that to become economically viable, a
s For example, if the steady-state non-elastic market share for RLV for the Medium vehicle class is
calculated to be 25%, then lhe market share in year four is 68% * 25% = 17°A,.
j ;
new launch system must generate new commercial markets." This group of aerospace
companies went on to perform market exploration studies, leading to the Commercial
Space Transportation Study 6 (CSTS). Data from the CSTS report is the basis for the
elastic market model.
An analysis of CSTS was performed to identify new commercial markets that
would develop in response to a reduction in the cost to orbit for a VentureStar class
vehicle. Fourteen specific product areas were identified, which were grouped into six
broad market segments: communications, manufacturinog/business parks, government,
tourism, entertainment, and other (including Helium-3 production and space burial). The
CSTS data was converted from a dollars per pound/pounds to orbit basis to a price per
flight/number of flights basis, assuming a 40K pound to LEO vehicle. Regression analysis
was performed, yielding the curve shown in Exhibit 5.
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Exhibit 5. Elastic Market Behavior.
Notice that nine flights per year are subtracted from the estimate. This is an
adjustment to reflect a more conser_ative assessment of enabling price and flight rate.
After all, the data is speculative, with no hard evidence that these opportunities will arise
as the price per flight falls. This adjustment has the effect of disabling the elastic market
above $40M which corresponds to $1000/lb. and seems to be a reasonable cutoff point..
Also notice that this market segment is properly termed elastic, since the coefficient of
elasticity is greater than one v. The equation in Exhibit 4 is considered an average or
nominal curve. Optimistic and conservative values are calculated at +/- 50% respectively,
of the average. The same market penetration approach used for the non-elastic market is
used for the elastic market.
6 The Commercial Space Transportation Study, Final Report was published in May, 1994. The six
companies participating in the study were Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Martin Marietta,
McDonnell Douglas, and Rock_vell. The quotes are from page I of the report.
7 Watson, Donald S., Price Theo_' and Its Uses, Second Editio.n, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1968; p. 37.
The coefficient of elasticity, is the relative change in quantity' divided by the relative change in price.
Model Operation and Outputs
The model is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet and operation is
straightforward. The user inputs three prices, one for each market segment. These prices
are then used to generate a total flight rate estimate by market segment. A ramp-up using
the market penetration assumptions previously explained is also calculated. An example
set of inputs and model estimated launch rates are shown in Exhibit 6. The launch rate by
market segment, for the same set of prices, is given in Exhibit 7.
Price Inputs (FY965M)
tR,LVPrice Per Flight Inelastic $75.0
RLV Price Per Flight Non-Elastic $40.0
.R..LVPrice Per Flight Elastic $20.0
Total Launch Rate Showing Ramp.Up
Year 1 Year 2 I Year3 Year4 Year 5
Conservative 9.6 16.9 27.9 46.3
13.1 22.6 36.3 64.9Average
Qptimistic
Exhibit 6.
17.1 28.2 44.7
35.6
48.4
60.9 83.5
Example Inputs and Total Launch Rate Estimate.
Launch Rate By Market, Steady State
Inelastic
[. Market.
Ay.erag e i 13.0
Optimis.tic i 13.0 i
Ngn-Elastic Market
GEO LEO
Conservative 13.0 8.1 6.7 4.7 13.8 1 46.3
9.5 5.7 i i 64.g
10.9
I Elastic
USG I Market Total
27.6
6.7 ! " 41.4 1 83.5
Exhibit 7. Launch Rate by Market Segment.
An overall flight rate curve, developed assuming the same price per flight for all
market segments, is shown in Exhibit 8. Analyzing the curve, several conclusions can be
drawn. The first is that the only market the RLV can access at a price per fight greater
than $90M is the inelastic (remember, an upper stage cost must be added to the price per
flight for GEO missions). Between $40M and $90M, the non-elastic market is enabled,
with flight rate increasing at a growing rate as the RLV begins to dominate more vehicle
classes. Below $40M, the effects of the elastic market are clearly seen. Note that a price
of $42M per flight is required to achieve a flight rate in the neighborhood o£35 per year.
Analysis performed by the Engineering Cost Office indicates that flight rates in the range
of 35 to 40 per year are necessary to ensure business viability of the RLV program.
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Exhibit 8. Overall RLV Flight Rate Curve.
Sensitivitv ,Analysis
The purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to check various assumptions for
robustness. A model whose conclusions change out of proportion to changes in the
quantitative assumptions may indicate the need for additional analysis. Some sensitivity
has been built into the market analysis model through the use of conservative, average,
and optimistic flight rates for the non-elastic and elastic markets. No range is provided for
the inelastic market since the flight rate is insensitive to changes in the price per flight.
However. two of the major assumptions used in the model need to be checked for
robustness These assumptions are the market capture function (Exhibit 3) and the prices
for upper stages
The market capture function is a simple approximation for what is actually a very
complex and dynamic marketplace. To test the impact of the aggressiveness of the
function with regards to market share increase or decrease, the model output is increased
or decreased by 20% and the overall RLV flight rate is calculated. Exhibit 9 gives the
results for three different price per flights. As can be seen in the graph, the model is
insensitive to small changes in the aggressiveness of the market capture function. The
average variation is +/- 5.5% over the price range, with a decrease in sensitivity occurring
as the price per flight increases. This trend may be due to the increasing importance of the
inelastic market as price per flight increases.
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The upper stage price sensitivity was examined by running the model a_er
increasing and decreasing the prices of all upper stages by $5M, As can be seen in Exhibit
I0, decreasing the price of" all upper stages by $5M increased the estimated annual flight
rate by 7% on average, with a greatest increase occurring at the lowest price per flight.
Increasing the upper stage prices by $5M lead to an average 5% reduction in the flight
rate. In order to compare the magnitude of" price change with the change in flight rate,
$5M is 50% of the small upper stage price, 25% of the medium upper stage, and 17% of
the large upper stage.
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The sensitivity analysis shov,,s that the changes in the quantitative assumptions
used in the model result in minimal changes in the flight rate estimate. Therefore, the
model is robust. It is important to note that this analysis has not tested the forms of the
non-elastic and elastic market behavior functions. These functions are a major determinate
of the annual flight rate. One way to test these functions would be to postulate
alternatives and incorporate these alternatives into the model. The model would then be
rerun and the estimates compared across a broad range of prices. A better approach for
the elastic model would be to update the CSTS data with a thorough, professional market
analysis, perhaps performed by a firm with no aerospace industry connections to insure
objectivity. For the non-elastic market, development of a payload manifesting simulation
model (based on compatibility, availability, and price) would allow simulations to be
performed testing market response to price per flight, while incorporating the effects of
other variables in the launch vehicle selection process.
Conclusion
The RLV Market Analysis model is at best a rough order approximation of actual
market behavior. However, it does give a quick indication if the flights exists to enable an
economically viable RLV, and the assumptions necessary for the vehicle to capture those
flights. Additional analysis, market research, and updating with the latest information on
payloads and launches would improve the model. Plans are to update the model as new
information becomes available and new requirements are levied This tool will continue to
be a vital part ofNASA's RLV business analysis capability for the foreseeable future.
